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SUMMARY & CONCLUSIONS 
An approach for the reliability analysis of systems with on 
demand, and dynamic failure modes is presented. Safety 
systems such as sprinkler systems, or other protection systems 
are characterized by such failure behavior. They have support 
subsystems to start up the system on demand, and once they 
start running, they are prone to dynamic failure. Failure on 
demand requires an availability analysis of components 
(typically electromechanical components) which are required 
to start or support the safety system. Once the safety system 
is started, it is often reasonable to assume that these support 
components do not fail while running. Further, these support 
components may be tested and maintained periodically while 
not in active use. Dynamic failure refers to the failure while 
running (once started) of the active components of the safety 
system. These active components may be fault tolerant and 
utilize spares or other forms of redundancy, but are not 
maintainable while in use. In this paper we describe a simple 
yet powerful approach to combining the availability analysis 
of the static components with a reliability analysis of the 
dynamic components. This approach is explained using a 
hypothetical example sprinkler system, and applied to a water 
deluge system taken from the offshore industry. The 
approach is implemented in the fault tree analysis software 
package, Galileo 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Reliability analysis of safety systems, for example sprinkler 
systems or other protection systems, requires the 
consideration of two kinds of failure behaviors: failure on 
demand and failure during operation. That is, the system may 
fail to start when needed (on demand) or, once started, it may 
fail during use. The failure of the system to start when needed 
would indicate it’s unavailability on demand; the failure once 
started indicates its unreliability during demand. Typically, 
the active components cannot be repairedmaintained during 
demand. The unavailability on demand of the system depends 
on the failure characteristics of its support components while 
in standby mode. These support components may be 
periodically tested and maintained while not in active mode. 
The unreliability during demand depends on the failure 
characteristics of the active components during demand. The 
reliability of the system is the probability that the system is 
available upon demand, and successfully achieves the mission 
operation during demand. In order to conduct a reliability 
analysis on such systems, we analyze each of the phases. The 
first phase is when the system is in standby mode, and the 
second phase, when the system is operational. This would 
require an availability analysis of the support subsystem in 
standby mode and a reliability analysis of the active 
components during demand. 
2. MOTIVATING EXAMPLE 
Let’s consider a hypothetical example system. The system is 
composed of three sensors, two pumps, one digital controller, 
and each pump has a support stream composed of valves and 
filters. The sensors send signals to the digital controller and 
when temperature readings at two of the sensors are above 
threshold, the controller activates the pump. The system will 
be available upon demand, if at least two of the sensors are 
operational, and at least one of the pumps starts. 
If a pump activates on demand, it means that the filters and 
valves in the pump stream are in working condition. At least 
one pump is needed for the system to operate. There is a 
backup pump which runs if the primary pump fails. System 
failure occurs if both the pumps are in a failed state. 
Once a sprinkler system is activated, the sensors are no longer 
needed for reliable operation. However, at least one pump 
and digital controller must remain operational for a 10 hour 
period. Once the pump system is started, the pump stream is 
unlikely to fail during operation. 
We can use a dynamic fault trees[6] to model the 
dependencies of the pumps on their pump streams. Dynamic 
fault frees extend traditional fault tree approaches by 
introducing special constraints to represent temporal 
relationships between various events. Functional 
dependencies are represented by functional dependency 
constraints [6]. The firnctional dependency constraint has a 
trigger input and one or more dependent inputs. When the 
trigger input occurs, the dependent inputs are forced to occur. 
A cold spare gate [flcan be used to model the backup pump 
which will get activated only if the primary pump fails. 
Dynamic fault trees are translated into Markov chains for 
solution[5]. The fault tree model of our hypothetical example 
system is shown in figure 1.  The cold spare gate(CSP) shows 
that pump 2 is a cold spare for pump 1, and is activated only if 
pump 1 fails. The functional dependency gates(FDEP) show 
the dependence of the pumps on their stream. The failure rate 
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Figure 1: Fault tree for hypothetical example system using functional dependency gate 
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Figure 2: Corresponding Markov chain for hypothetical example system. 
of each component is shown underneath the basic events system. Uncovered failures, however, always lead to 
Corresponding to the component in the figure 1, The Markov 
chain corresponding to the fault tree in figure 1 is shown in 
figure 2. The parameter c is used to indicate coveredfailures 
[3]. Covered faiiures of components may or may not lead to 
system failure depending on the remaining redundancy of the 
immediate system failure. 
Although the pump streams and the sensors are only used to 
start up the system, the Markov chain in figure 2 takes them 
into consideration throughout the analysis, and they create 
additional states in the corresponding Markov chain. Real 
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Figure 3: Separate models for pump streams, sensors, and dynamic subsystem 
systems are more complex than our hypothEtical example 
system, and state explosion is a problem often encountered 
when using Markov chains. 
Moreover, in some instances, the components used to start up 
the system are also active during demand, but have different 
failure parameters. Different failure parameters cannot easily 
be modeled in this approach. Also, the support subsystem 
may be subject to repair and maintenance while the system is 
in standby mode. This is another attribute of the system that 
cannot be modeled using the above methodology. 
A better approach would separate the availability analysis of 
the standby subsystem and the reliability analysis of the 
dynamic subsystem. For instance, we could create separate 
models for the analysis of each of the pump streams, as well 
as the sensors. This would be a viable approach since the 
pump streams and the sensors are independent. These 
separate models are shown in figure 3. This process entails 
the solution of three separate models, and the mapping of 
relevant information between these models. This could be a 
tedious procedure, if it is done manually, and without 
structure. It is for this reason that we define an approach and 
methodology for addressing this problem in the context of 
dynamic fault tree analysis. Furthermore, we create a module 
in the widely distributed reliability analysis software package, 
Galileo[7], which handles systems with dynamic and on- 
demand failure modes automatically. Our approach is 
explained in more detail in the following sections. 
3. GENERAL APPROACH USING DYNAMIC 
FAULT TREE 
3.1 Overview of approach 
The approach that we present in this paper divides the 
reliability analysis of our hypothetical example system into 
two separate phases: availability analysis of the support 
system in standby mode, and reliability analysis of the system 
in dynamic mode. The steady state availability of the support 
components is obtained in the availability analysis phase. 
This steady state unavailability then determines the initial 
state probabilities of the Markov chain that only consists of 
the components that are in active mode during demand. 
This simple yet powerhl approach automatically combines 
the availability analysis of the system while in static mode 
with a reliability analysis of the system in active mode. The 
suggested approach is summarized in figure 3. Although this 
approach is fairly intuitive for a Reliability Engineer, it is not 
always easy to implement manually. This is because most 
systems are too complex for manual solution. We define and 
implement a new module in the widely distributed fault tree 
analysis software tool, Galileo[7]. This module models 
systems with on-demand and dynamic failure modes and 
solves for the reliability parameters, using this approach. 
The work presented in this paper builds on the preliminary 
approach to a similar problem developed by Andrews & 
Ridley[2]. We have adapted the approach in [Z] and 
engineered it to work within the modular dynamic fault tree 
analysis framework presented in [SI and[9], and implemented 
in Galileo[7]. 
3.2 Demand dependency gate 
Within the context of a dynamic fault tree model, we define a 
new constraint to model failure on demand. The first input (or 
trigger input) to the demand dependency constraint is a fault 
tree describing the causes pf failure on demand (or failure to 
start). This input can be either a static or dynamic fault tree. 
Components in this subtree are characterized by failure 
parameters, repair rates and/or maintenance intervals. T 
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Figure 5 Fault tree for hypothetical example system using Demand Dependency Constraints 
sub-tree is solved for the steady-state unavailability, which 
represents the probability that the subsystem is unable to start 
the safety system when demanded. The remaining inputs are 
dependent events which represent those components of the 
system whose functionality depends on the availability on 
demand of the subsystem represented by the trigger input. 
When the trigger input is unavailable, the dependent inputs 
are forced to occur. Therefore, the probability of occurrence 
of these inputs upon demand corresponds to the unavailability 
of the subtree representing the trigger input. For instance, 
consider a pump that depends on the availability of its pump 
stream in order to operate. The pump stream which consists 
of filters and valves would represent the fvst input to the 
demand dependency constraint, and the pump would be the 
dependent event. 
3.3 Modeling hypothetical example 
system using the demand dependency 
constraint 
The fault tree model of the hypothetical example system using 
the Demand Dependency Constraint can be seen in figure 5 .  
The dependence of the system stamrp on the correct 
functionality of at least two of the sensors is shown by the 
fvst demand dependency constraint. If these sensors are 
unavailable at the time of demand, the pumps become 
unavailable, and hence the system cannot start up. On the 
other hand, the pumps also need their respective pump 
streams to be working in order to start up. This is shown by 
the other demand dependency constraints. Pump 2 is a 
backup pump, and is activated only if pumpl is in a failed 
state. Therefore, if the pump stream for pumpl is unavailable, 
but the pump stream for pump2 is available, and the sensors 
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Figure 6: Mapping scheme for initial state probabilities of the reliability analysis phase 
are available, the system will start up using pump2, instead of 
pump 1. 
The separate subsystems of our hypothetical example system 
are modeled using Markov chains in figure 3. However, this 
is only for clarification purposes, and the steady state 
unavailability of the pumps can also be computed by using 
combinatorial methods, such as Binay Decision Diagrams 
(BDD 's)[4]. This is because the subsystems corresponding to 
the pump streams and sensors are static fault trees. Modeling 
static subsystems using BDD's makes our solution procedure 
more efficient. 
Our approach for solving this problem is to initially find the 
steady state unavailability of the sensors and the pump 
streams. If the sensors are unavailable, then the system cannot 
start, and the initial state for the Markov chain corresponding 
to the reliability analysis would be a failed state. If either of 
the pump streams cannot start, then their respective pumps 
will be unavailable, and the initial state of the Markov chain 
can be found accordingly. The initial state to the Markov 
chain is the state with all the components up only if the 
sensors and the pump streams are all available upon demand. 
The approach can be seen in figure 6. The unavailability of 
pump streams and sensors are computed by conducting an 
availability analysis on their corresponding fault tree models. 
4. SAFETY SYSTEM DESCRIPTION (WATER 
DELUGE SYSTEM) 
Figure 'I: Schematic representation of the 
deluge system pump stream 
The unavailability measures are then used to find the initial 
state probabilities of the Markov chain corresponding to the 
reliability analysis phase. 
The water deluge system[3] used to illustrate the dependency 
methodology is shown in figure 7. The features of this system 
are typical of water spray systems used in many different off- 
shore industries. Four pumps are used to provide the water 
demand to the ringmain. The ringmain transports the water 
round the platform to the take-off points where it is used to 
protect against the hazards posed by hydrocarbon fires and 
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Figure 8: Fault tree model of computer system 
in WDS 
explosions. Pressure in the ringmain is maintained by a 
jockey pump (not shown in the figure). When the take-off 
valves open and water is delivered to the spray nozzles the 
ringmain pressure will drop. Ringmain pressure is monitored 
and transmitted to the computer control system by the three 
pressure transmitters (PSI-PS3). When two of the three 
transmitters indicate a low ringmain pressure the main pumps 
are activated in the order indicated from top to bottom of the 
diagram (i.e. EPI, EP2, DPl, DP2). As long as two pumps 
are available then water can be delivered at the required rate 
to satisfy demand. Four pumps provide redundancy in the 
system. Pumps 1 and 2 are electric powered and pumps 3 and 
4 are the diesel backups. 
The features on each pump stream are identical. As the water 
supply is direct from the sea a filter is fitted on each stream. 
Manual isolation valves are located for maintenance purposes 
located either side of the pump. A pressure relief valve 
provides protection for the pump and a test valve on each line 
enables individual pumps to be tested without fully activating 
the deluge system. 
There are two failure modes of concem for each stream, the 
first is that it fails to start (unavailable) and the second is that 
it fails once running ( unreliable). If a pump stream activates 
on demand it means that the filter, isolation valves, test valve 
Hot nparefails 
and pressure relief valve which are all (for this function) 
passive components are in the working condition. As they are 
passive they are unlikely to fail in the relatively short running 
times if they work initially. These are static failure modes. 
The pump is however a dynamic component and can also fail 
once running. System failure will occur if fewer than two of 
the four streams can be activated (i.e. 3 from 4 fail). 
5. FAULT TREE MODEL OF EXAMPLE 
The computer control system consists of the three pressure 
sensors (of which 2 are needed), plus the hardware and the 
software. The hardware consists of redundant processors in 
hot standby mode, each equipped with identical software. 
While the spare processor is in spare mode, it is monitoring 
the inputs and outputs of the primary, in order to provide 
detection and recovery in case of error. When an error is 
detected, control is switched to the backup processor. The 
computer control system can thus tolerate a single (detected) 
hardware or software failure. However, an undetected error 
causes failure of the computer subsystem regardless of the 
state of the backup. This latter case (undetected error) is an 
example of an uncovered fault, which leads to immediate 
system failure. Another example of an uncovered fault is a 
software fault that affects both processors simultaneously. 
One might expect, since the software on both processors is 
identical, that all software faults would affect both processors. 
However, there is field data to support the assumption that a 
large percentage of software faults will affect only a single 
processor[l]. Modeling uncovered faults is crucial to the 
analysis of a fault tolerant computer system, and is discussed 
in more detail in[4] and [ 5 ] .  A fault tree model showing the 
failure of the computer system is shown in figure 8, in which 
the basic events represent hardware (processors), software and 
the sensor set. 
Next consider the pump system, consisting of the four pumps, 
their power sources (two are electric and two are diesel) and 
their pump streams (associated valves and filters). For now, 
let us ignore the pump streams and power supplies, and 
concentrate on the four pumps. 
The set of four pumps operate in standby redundancy in that 
the two electric pumps are started first, and the diesel pumps 
provide replacements when the electric pumps are 
unavailable. On demand, pumps EP1 and EP2 are turned on. 
If one of these two should fail, it is replaced by DPI. The 
second pump failure is replaced by pump DP2. This dynamic 
redundancy scheme introduces dependencies between the 
failures and requires special modeling techniques. A pump 
which is in use experiences a different failure rate than one in 
standby. Therefore, we need to keep track of which pumps 
are being used and which are in standby. We use a spare gate 
to model the failure dependencies that arise from the use of 
spares. 
A spare gate is one of several dynamic gates introduced in [5] 
and it is used to model several dependencies associated with 
SAFETY SYSTEM 
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Figure 9: Fault tree showing pump system for WDS 
the use of spares. First, a component which is used as a spare 
has an associated dormancy factor (between zero and one 
inclusive) which is a multiplicative factor to the active failure 
rate to produce the spare failure rate. If the dormancy factor 
is zero, the spare is said to be a cold spare; a cold spare cannot 
fail before being switched into active operation (failure to 
activate is modeled as an uncovered failure). If the dormancy 
factor is unity, then the spare is said to be a hot spare and can 
fail at the same rate as when active. The in between situation 
is referred to as a warm spare; a warm spare can fail before 
switched into active operation, but does so at a lower rate than 
when active. 
The second dependency handled by the spare gate is the use 
of pooled spares, which are spares that can be used as a 
replacement for whichever of a set of components fails fust. 
Modeling pooled spares requires us to keep track of not only 
the state of each component, but also the order in which they 
have failed, so that we can determine which spare is being 
used where. Further, it might be the case that components 
have preferences for replacements, in that there is an priority 
or order in which spares are utilized. This order may well be 
different for different components. 
The spare gate has a set of at least two inputs, the first 
(leftmost) of which is the designated primary, and the second 
and subsequent (from left to right) are the spares. When the 
primary fails, it is replaced (in order) by the spares which are 
still available (i.e. not failed and not used elsewhere). The 
single output of the spare gate returns true when the primary 
and the spares have been exhausted. Basic events 
1 
milure 
U I 
representing spares have failure rates, coverage factors and 
dormancy factors. 
~j~~~~ 1 0  Fault tree pump stream for WDS 
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Continuing to ignore the power supplies and pump streams, 
the fault tree in figure 3 models the pumps and their spares. 
The pump system fails when there are no longer two available 
pumps (thus the OR gate with two inputs). The basic events 
labeled EPI and EFZ represent the two electric pumps, which 
are both initially active (on demand). The two diesel pumps 
(DPI and DP2) are pooled spares shared by both electric 
pumps. The fwst electric pump failure is replaced by DPI and 
the second by DP2. Note that if EF’2 preferred to be replaced 
by DP2 then we could switch order the DPl and DP2 inputs 
on the second spare gate. 
Next let us consider the power supplies. There is an electrical 
power supply for pumps EPI and EP2 and a diesel supply for 
DPl and D E .  If a power supply fails, then the associated 
pumps are unavailable (essentially failed). This type of 
functional dependency of one component on another is easily 
modeled with a jimctional dependency gate[5]. The 
functional dependency gate has a trigger input and one or 
more dependent inputs; when the event associated with the 
trigger input occurs, the dependent inputs are then forced to 
occur. The functional dependency gate can be used to model 
the functional dependence of the pumps on the power 
supplies: the power supply is the trigger event and the two 
pumps are the dependent events. This is shown in the fault 
tree in figure 9. 
Using the demand dependency constraint, we separate the 
static analysis of the pump stream frnm the dynamic analysis 
of the pumps themselves. The demand dependency constraint 
can be used to model the dependence on demand of the pumps 
on the pump stream. The pump stream is the trigger event 
and the pump is the dependent event. The implication of this 
constraint is that the pumps can fail to start on demand due tn 
the unavailability of the pump stream. Since the 
unavailability of the pump stream at the moment that demand 
occurs determines whether or not the corresponding pump is 
available, the demand dependency constraint is designed to 
reflect a snapshot of the pump stream. The corresponding 
fault tree can be seen in figure IO. 
The advantage of this approach is that it reduces the number 
of states in our Markov chain. The Markov chain which is 
used to solve this system doesn’t need to take into account the 
valves and filters. Since the pump streams are unlikely to fail 
once the pump is running, it is not necessary to model each 
filter and valve in the reliability analysis phase. It is sufficient 
to know whether the stream is available on demand. The 
probability that the stream is available on demand is 
determined for each stream, and is used to determine the 
initial state probabilities for the Markov analysis of the pumps 
and power supplies in the reliability phase. 
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